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Introduction 
 
 The Saudi government was 
surprisingly quick to respond to the 
Covid-19 pandemic. One of the decisive 
measures it took was closing the holy 
sites of Mecca and Medina, something 
which had not happened since 
Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. 
Notably, the closure did not evoke any 
protest from its religious circles. Quite 
the opposite, the government managed 
to mobilize the religious establishment, 
which apparently also had realized the 
severity of the coronavirus threat. 
 The pandemic crisis comes at a 
time of existing economic turmoil on the 
oil market. The price of one barrel of 
crude oil plummeted to an unimaginable 
and dramatic low, which caused the 
government to announce a strong set of 
austerity measures, as well as a 
stimulus package to alleviate some of 
the immediate burden on its population. 
It is clear that this will significantly halt 
progress on the already slow moving 
Vision 2030 project whilst tapping the 
debt market will continue to increase. 
Riyadh also announced a one-sided, 
fourteen day ceasefire in Yemen in the 
beginning of April. 
 Like so many other countries, 
Saudi Arabia needs to prepare itself for 
‘the new normal’ after the Corona crisis 
ends. Less money, less expenses. 
Could it be a ‘blessing in disguise’ for 
Mohammed bin Salman who previously 
                                                 
1 Much work on the spread of Wahhabism has 
been done by authors like David Commins, 
Reinhard Schulze, Madawi Al-Rasheed, 
Bernard Haykal, Gilles Kepel, Saeed Shehabi, 
Stéphane Lacroix, Guido Steinberg, Natana J. 
DeLong-Bas, Nakil Yannick Ak'abal Bieri, Nabil 
argued for a return to moderate Islam? 
And more importantly: could this be 
extended to the realm of ‘religious 
diplomacy’, the use of Islam as soft 
power in foreign policy? 
 
More than export of conservatism? 
 
 Since the sixties Saudi Arabia 
spent tens of billions of dollars – some 
sources argue it is close to a hundred 
billion dollar –on the dissemination of 
what the regime considers to be the true 
form of Islam.1 Via the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs, Da'wa, and Guidance, 
institutions like the Muslim World 
League (MWL), the World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the 
International Organization for Relief, 
Welfare  and Development (previously 
called the  International Islamic Relief 
Organization, IIRO) – the list is non-
exhaustive – it has funded countless 
mosques and set up numerous charities 
and schools. It launched tv stations, 
distributed Qurans and educated 
massive amounts of students at Saudi 
religious universities (mainly the Islamic 
University of Medina).  
 Much has been written about the 
reach and impact of this policy, all too 
often using hyperboles and applying 
little nuance. The ‘export of Wahhabism’ 
has been too easily equated with the 
‘export of extremism’, paying little 
attention to the complexity of the matter. 
However, one thing goes without 
Mouline, among others. Noticable are two 
forthcoming publications: Peter Mandaville, 
Wahhabism and the World: Understanding 
Saudi Arabia’s Global Influence on Islam, and 
Krithika Varagur, The Call: Inside the Global 
Saudi Religious Project. 
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saying: because of the Saudi influence, 
global Islam is now more conservative 
than it would have been without it. But 
beyond that simple conclusion? 
Opinions differ widely. 
 We can roughly distinguish four 
views. The first can be described as 
‘scapegoating': Wahhabism (or 
Salafism) leads, directly or indirectly, to 
extremism and terrorism. Its simplicity 
makes this viewpoint widespread and 
popular. The second outlook refers to 
the sterility of ideology. Any system of 
ideas and ideals only becomes relevant 
if it corresponds to a demand and              
a need. In other words, do people  
choose ideas or vice versa? Local 
circumstances (i.e. the broad scala of 
possible political, social, economic 
and/or psychological factors that can 
cause people to be dissatisfied with 
themselves and their environment) are 
usually decisive. The urge to practically 
resolve these issues typically only 
follows later. That ‘urge’ can be to seek 
refuge in religious piety, of which the 
components are also supplied by Saudi 
Arabia, or in its most extreme form to 
commit a terrorist attack.  
 A third vision holds that local 
circumstances are seen as the 
determining factor. The way Saudi 
influence manifests itself in receiving 
countries depends on specific, local 
conditions. After each attack claimed by 
an Islamic group, blame is often easily 
assigned to Saudi Arabia. Yet it is 
hardly ever possible to find a direct 
connection between the perpetrators 
and the ‘export of Wahhabism’. Many 
                                                 
2 E.g., see Aurélie Biard, '"'We pray for our 
president": Saudi-inspired loyalist Salafism and 
the business sector in Kazakhstan', Berkley 
Center for Religion, Peace & world Affairs, 
Working Paper, January 2019.  
3 An excellent analysis of the factors mentioned 
above can be found in the work of Peter 
times it involves a criminal background 
(some researchers claim up to 80% of 
cases), superficial knowledge of Islam 
and not every terrorist frequently visits a 
mosque. Insofar extremist ideas spread 
by Saudi imams and others were of 
clear influence, those ideas ‘only form 
part of the cocktail [of explanations]’ as 
Hind Fraihi puts it. 
 The fourth view point analyses the 
phenomenon in terms of the sorcerer's 
apprentice effect. This vision indicates 
that the exported Salafist ideology – 
extremely conservative, intolerant and 
xenophobic – was (and is) generally 
politically quietist.2 Islam 'dictates that 
we should obey and hear the ruler', 
confirms MWL's secretary-general 
Mohammed bin Abdul-Karim al-Issa. 
The success of jihad in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s, thanks in part to generous 
injections of Saudi oil dollars, added a 
revolutionary political component to 
international Salafism, at least for some 
of its supporters. This meant that Saudi 
Arabia started to lose control of the 
global Salafi-Wahhabi movement from 
the 1980s onwards. In fact, since the 
1990s, this revolutionary Salafism also 
put the House of Saud on its hit list, 
which resulted in terrorist acts by Al-
Qaeda from 2003 to 2008 on Saudi soil. 
In recent years, Islamic State also 
committed several terrorist attacks in 
the Kingdom. Both organizations can 
therefore be considered as sorcerer 
apprentices of the ‘original’ 
Wahhabism.3 
 
 
Mandaville and Shadi Hamid, 'Islam as 
Statecraft:  How  Governments  Use  Religion  
in  Foreign  Policy'  (Foreign  Policy                         
at Brookings, November 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/islam-as-
statecraft-how-governments-use-religion-in-
foreign-policy/ 
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Wahhabism lite? 
 
 With the above analysis in mind 
and taking into account recent 
developments in Saudia Arabia under 
the   reign   of   the   Salmans,   we       
then   wonder   whether   there  has  
been an inclination towards ‘de-
Wahhabization'.4 If this is indeed the 
case, how seriously should we take it 
and what is the relationship between the 
royal family, the religious establishment 
and the independent clergy? 
 In numerous interviews, the crown 
prince has expressed his eagerness to 
leave the 'years of extremist Islam' 
behind. Since 1979 Islam has been 
hijacked, he argues, and needs to be 
'restored'. That year did not just witness 
a revolution in Iran, it also marked the 
beginning of the Soviet occupation in 
Afghanistan and Wahhabi zealots 
occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca. 
Regardless of whether the earlier Islam 
was really that moderate (and whether 
the importance of the Iranian revolution 
is overestimated or not), Wahhabism 
developed an even stricter 
interpretation after 1979, with a lot of 
room for religious hardliners. The 
events of ‘9/11’ changed this somewhat. 
For example, then Crown Prince 
Abdullah warned against offering the 
extremist clergy too much space. In 
later years, during the reign of Abdullah, 
a cautious start was made with a 
revision of the educational curriculum 
(which was loaded with hate speech). 
All in all however, these changes were 
minimal and the wave of terrorist 
                                                 
4 In an interview with The Atlantic (April 2, 2018) 
Mohammed bin Salman rebuffed to even 
acknowledge the existence of this creed, let 
alone its role as one of the Kingdom’s foreign 
policy drivers in past decades. He questioned 
the existence of Wahhabism itself: 'No one can 
violence on home soil (2003-2008) did 
not change that. 
 The real test came when Islamic 
State arrived on the scene. In June 
2014, IS declared a caliphate which 
aimed to be a copy of the first 'real' 
Wahhabi state (1744-1818). King 
Abdullah consequently demanded that 
the religious authorities would declare 
their disapproval, but this happened 
only sparsely. Many clerics simply 
sympathized with Syrian jihad against 
the Iranian-backed Bashar al-Assad 
regime. As far as there was any debate 
within the clergy, it was triggered by 
Hatem al-Awni, a dissident loner who 
advocated a more than cosmetic reform 
of Wahhabism. It is unknown how much 
space for criticism the current crown 
prince leaves al-Awni, but it is a well-
known fact that numerous other 
religious activists face severe 
repression. 
 In recent years, there have been 
noticeable domestic changes which 
extended far beyond just the economic 
realm. The limitation of the powers of 
the mutawwa (the religious police), 
followed by, among other things, a 
relaxation of the previously strict 
conservative rules around male-female 
relations, speak volumes. Although its 
importance is certainly not insignificant, 
these increased socio-cultural 
freedoms must be contrasted with the 
greatly increased political repression. 
Clearly, reform and repression go hand 
in hand. 
 Still, the domestic policies of the 
government remain ambiguous. All 
things considered, it predominantly 
define Wahhabism. There is no Wahhabism. 
We don't believe we have Wahhabism.' 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archiv
e/2018/04/mohammed-bin-salman-iran-
israel/557036/ 
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comes down to condemning critics from 
the Sahwa movement, like Salman al-
Awda, Ali al-Omari and Awadh al-Qarni. 
Anyone suspected of sympathizing with 
the Muslim Brotherhood (which is 
considered a terrorist organization since 
2014) is deemed a state risk. And its 
main religious institution, the Council of 
Senior Scholars, despite harboring a 
number of questionable hardliners, 
maintains excellent relations with the 
king and crown prince. 
 If we zoom in on the foreign 
dimension, the picture does not 
necessarily become clearer. Mandaville 
and Hamid rightly point out there is no 
surplus of studies available on this 
topic, but Jonathan Benthall's study on 
Saudi overseas humanitarian charities 
may provide some insight. He reviewed 
the International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO or IIROSA) and 
concluded that among other things, 
humanitarian initiatives have been 
'rationalized' and 'centralized' since 
2017. In other words, the King Salman 
Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center 
(KSRelief) has a monopoly on all 
foreign aid programs, with the exception 
of some programs run by the MWL. 
Benthall gathers that "(...) the kingdom's 
new policy of centralization, and its 
disengagement from the 
'comprehensive call to Islam', resulted 
in a remodelling of IIROSA's role in 
support of the kingdom's diplomatic 
interest but marginalized and stripped of 
religious content." In itself, that is not 
necessarily bad news, except that 
according to Benthall's own 
assessment it resulted in a 
'humanitarian deficit'. Qatar, Turkey and 
                                                 
5 It should be soberly noted that whatever 
reforms are being undertaken, the horses have 
long left the barn and even if Saudi Salafists are 
not anymore – or much less – the drivers of the 
the UAE are more important donors 
than Saudi Arabia. 
 Another notable development can 
be observed within the MWL since 
Mohammed al-Issa took office as 
secretary-general in 2016. He is 
recognized as 'a leader and champion 
of interfaith dialogue', known for his use 
of reconciling language. However, as 
Sara Feuer points out, it remains to be 
seen whether there is more than just a 
‘discursive shift’ taking place. Feuer's 
study of MWL's relations with the Grand 
Mosque in Brussels raises sufficient 
doubts about actual changes ‘on the 
ground’ in areas where the League was 
active. "Here the picture is less clear 
and less encouraging, at least thus far," 
the author concludes. As long as the 
MWL remains a junior player within the 
broad palette of Saudi authorities and 
significant changes in places such as 
the Ministries of Islamic Affairs and 
Foreign Affairs (as well as several 
universities) fail to materialize, 
expectations of serious reforms need to 
be tempered.5 
 A final lead that can shed a light on 
a possible departure in the direction of 
‘Wahhabism lite’ is a recent study on 
2016-19 textbooks. Strikingly enough, 
the new batch of textbooks contains 
subtle, but substantial changes in 
'language, tone, narrative and outlook'. 
The study concludes that clear attempts 
have been made to treat 'the Other' as 
less hostile, although there are still 
plenty of problematic passages to be 
observed. The building blocks for a new 
kind of national identity are present, with 
room for the pre-Islamic past. However, 
in daily practice this often boils down to 
a form of 'hyper-nationalism', which 
argument, the impact of Wahhabism's export 
has had a globally long-lasting impact (taking all 
the nuances sketched above into account).  
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presents its own problem, especially in 
regard to relations with Iran (but also 
Qatar). 
 
Breaking the umbilical cord? 
 
 Forecasting the Kingdom's future 
is little more than a guessing game. 
However, a preliminary conclusion is 
that a denunciation of the historical pact 
between the Al Saud and the Wahhabi 
religious establishment is not imminent 
(though it must be pointed out that 
mutual relations have regularly been 
altered – mostly to the detriment of the 
clergy).  
 Interestingly, many of the 
measures taken by Mohammed bin 
Salman prove to the radical opposition 
that he is an 'American agent'. His 
'moderate Islam' is therefore an 
'American Islam'. Should the economic 
reforms launched by the crown prince 
fail – and this is certainly not out of the 
question now that the economy is being 
hit hard by the coronavirus and the 
collapsed oil market – organizations like 
Al-Qaeda can benefit. However, 
speculations about a possible revolt by 
dissenting clerics seem overblown. The 
umbilical cord is still too resilient. To 
break it, Nabil Mouline argued two years 
ago, “it is necessary to have an 
alternative social project, the unfailing 
support of the elites and the population, 
a sound economic base and a very 
favourable context”. Today, this is more 
unlikely than ever. 
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